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This paper uses private and environmental cost data for the Netherlands to evaluate the 
social cost of two final waste disposal methods, landfilling versus incineration using 
waste-to-energy (WTE) plants. The data only provide some support for the widespread 
policy preference for incineration over landfilling if the analysis is restricted to 
environmental costs alone. Private costs, however, are so much higher for incineration, 
that landfilling is the social cost minimizing option at the margin even in a densely 
populated country such as the Netherlands. Implications for waste policy are discussed 
as well. Proper treatment of and energy recovery from landfills seem to be the most 
important targets for waste policy. WTE plants are a very expensive way to save on 
climate change emissions. 
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Most developed countries, in particular European countries and Japan, have adopted a hierarchical 
approach to solid waste management, including final waste disposal options. First of all, waste should be 
reduced, otherwise recycled, next incinerated and, only if nothing else works, landfilled. Landfilling is 
often considered to be the worst option because it consumes a lot of space and runs a high risk of 
leakages to air, water and soil. Incineration produces fewer externalities, in particular in so-called waste-
to-energy (WTE) facilities (Miranda and Hale, 1997). These facilities not only reduce final disposal of 
waste, but also produce electricity and/or heat, saving (energy) resources elsewhere. In other words, 
burning waste in waste incineration plants facilitates compliance with the Kyoto protocol. 
However, incineration plants also contribute to externalities, such as emissions to air and chemical 
waste residuals. In addition, they are expensive to build even compared with modern landfills with 
appropriate prevention of leaking. Methane emissions of landfills, the main source of emissions to air, can 
be reduced by flaring, and can even be used to produce energy as well. In fact, the relative performance 
of incineration depends not only on its own emissions profile but also on the different technological 
options for landfilling, and all of their associated private and environmental costs, including their recovery 
characteristics. 
Ideally, the choice between final waste disposal methods requires a systematic comparison of all 
costs and benefits involved, i.e. a proper social cost–benefit analysis proper. Obtaining information on 
individual preferences for final waste disposal facilities, however, is surrounded by difficulties, especially 
if social costs are included (Miranda and Hale, 1997). Moreover, these individual preferences do not 
necessarily provide useful information due to free-rider effects such as NIMBY problems. Consequently, 
the focus of recent analytical and empirical studies has been on (social) cost comparisons, mainly on the 
assumption that the cost characteristics of different waste disposal programs would be easier to come by, 
while (social) cost minimization is a necessary condition for welfare maximization anyway.  
For instance, Keeler and Renkow’s interesting analytical contribution (1994) analyzes the 
desirability of incineration relative to recycling and landfilling based on their differences in (marginal) cost. 
However, this study only includes energy production by incineration, and it neglects the role of 
environmental externalities. Brisson (1997) is one of the first to extend this framework of analysis to the 
role of (marginal) social cost, building on a simple linear model of social cost minimization by a 
government.
1 Empirical work on the performance evaluation of final waste disposal methods, however, is 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, her model allows only for interior solutions, implying that a government should always choose a mix 
of both options. In our opinion, there are no ex-ante reasons for such a limitation. Social cost might also be minimized 




not always adequate from the social cost perspective, and is often disfigured by lack of data. Earlier 
attempts focus only on environmental risks (e.g. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 1999), lack private 
cost data, apply an asymmetric (extended) private cost analysis only (Keeler and Renkow, 1994), use very 
rough or incomplete data on (indirect) environmental impacts, or exclude the recovery functions or 
include them inadequately (Brisson, 1997).  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to present an encompassing empirical analysis of the 
entire final waste disposal system including the indirect effects of its recovery functions from a social 
cost perspective. We have data describing a reasonable set of available (technical) options for each 
disposal method, as well as on their associated private costs and cost performance in terms of 
environmental externalities and energy and materials recovery. We present the results from a 
comprehensive data-set on the average social cost of two ‘best-practice’ technologies for incineration and 
landfilling. The data are taken entirely from the Netherlands and reflect (partly revealed) cost estimates of 
technologies that comply with the strictest waste disposal regulation in the world. Moreover, 
environmental conditions for final waste disposal are rather poor because the Netherlands is not only 
densely populated, like Singapore and Japan and some areas in the USA, but also faces pretty bad soil 
conditions for landfills.
2 If WTE plants were to signal lower social cost than landfilling anywhere, one 
would expect them to do so in the Netherlands. 
Interestingly, our analysis casts serious doubts on the current policy preference for incineration 
over landfilling. With both private and environmental costs included, we find much lower overall cost for 
landfilling than for incineration. Only the savings on environmental externalities associated with recovery 
functions are responsible for lower environmental costs for incineration than for landfilling. But our 
calculations also suggest that, within a reasonable confidence margin for the shadow prices used, the 
overall environmental cost savings from WTE compared with landfilling are small in a proper 
environmental impact analysis, and they are certainly unlikely to compensate for the large differences in 
private costs. So a shift from incineration without energy recovery to a WTE plant indeed minimizes 
social cost, and may also reflect a local minimum. Indeed, proper (environmental) treatment of landfills 
and using landfill gas for energy production seem to be promising targets for any social cost minimizing 
waste policy. We also argue that this result generalizes to other European countries and probably to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
available, such as including or excluding energy and materials recovery. Analytically, this requires a Kuhn–Tucker 
setup of the social cost minimization framework instead of the Lagrangian optimization technique applied by Brisson 
(1997). 
2 Indeed, Dutch final waste disposal policy has almost exclusively focused on expanding incineration, in particular in 





The paper is organized as follows. We first illustrate the existing policy preferences for final waste 
disposal options in several developed, particularly European, countries (Section II). Next we discuss the 
characteristics of our social cost–benefit analysis of the choice between landfilling and incineration (Section 
III). Then we present our results for the best available techniques for the Netherlands (Section IV), and we 
explore the sensitivity of our results in Section V. Section VI analyzes the different arguments in the current 
policy debate on waste disposal options and how they relate to the  choice of technological options, in 
particular in the European Union (EU). The last section presents some conclusions and discusses further 
research. 
Note that we do not consider the issue of illegal dumping or other forms of non-compliance behavior 
(see Fullerton, forthcoming), nor do we evaluate issues related to the interaction between the choice of final 
waste disposal methods and recycling (e.g. Huhtala, 1999). By analyzing the choice between landfilling and 
incineration, we implicitly restrict ourselves to that part of the overall waste stream where both options are 
available, namely burnable waste. Therefore, we also neglect issues related to specific waste streams, such as 
hazardous waste (including radioactive waste). 
 
II Existing waste hierarchies 
In most developed countries, in particular within the EU and Japan, there is widespread belief in the previously 
mentioned hierarchy for waste disposal options. This belief is often reflected in governmental documents or 
even in existing environmental law. For instance, the EU confirmed this hierarchy in preparing its recent 
directives on landfilling and incineration: 
The 1996 Commission Communication on the review of the Community Strategy for Waste 
Management confirmed the hierarchy of waste principles established by the Communication 
of 1989. The principle of prevention of waste generation remains the first priority, followed 
by recovery and finally by the safe disposal of waste i.e. landfilling. In the Community 
Waste Strategy landfilling represents the option of last resort because it can have substantial 
negative impacts on the environment. … Landfilling as a waste management method has no 
effect on the prevention of waste and does not make use of waste as a resource, which has 
a higher priority in the Community Waste Strategy. (COM(97), p. 3) 
Apparently, the hierarchical approach of the European Commission relies on a rather asymmetric judgment in 
comparing the different waste strategies. It does include environmental costs for landfilling, but only stresses 




being landfilled (see COM(99)31), while it remains unclear whether private costs have to play a role in 
decisions over waste disposal options by Member States. 
In contrast, the USA has not had a clear preference for incineration over landfilling for a long time. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also follows a hierarchical approach in its waste policy, with a 
preference for source reduction, followed by recycling (including composting) and finally by disposal in 
combustion facilities and landfills. However, the EPA explicitly mentions indifference between the final waste 
disposal methods: 
Waste combustion and landfilling are at the bottom of the hierarchy – USEPA does not rank 
one of these options higher than the other, as both are viable components of an integrated 
system. (EPA, 1995, p. xxvii) 
The use of energy and residual materials, however, is unquestioned as well: 
When waste generation is unavoidable, the materials can be viewed as a resource from 
which reusable materials, raw feedstock, minerals, organic matters, nutrients, and energy 
can be recovered for beneficial uses. (EPA, 1995, p. iii) 
Although there is no explicit preference for incineration in the USA, reuse of materials and use of WTE 
facilities are undisputed to the EPA as well, again without any explicit reference to private cost.
3 
Existing final waste disposal, however, is still dominated by landfilling, even if stated policy 
preferences suggest otherwise. The first column of Table 1 shows that fewer than half of the EU countries 
plus Japan incinerate over 50% of their domestic waste. In contrast, Finland, Italy, Spain, the UK and the 
USA have a very low percentage of incinerated waste, while Greece, Ireland and Portugal incinerate no waste 
at all. Nevertheless, waste incineration has become more popular in most EU countries, in particular because 
of its alleged benefit of energy recovery. Over the last decade, newly built waste incineration plants have 
always included energy recovery facilities, and older plants without energy recovery have been closed. In the 
early 1990s, on average only a small part of total waste incinerated was with energy recovery, but this 
percentage is almost 100% in most countries today.
4 Indeed, WTE plants may seem to be preferable from a 
social cost perspective. First, it is often assumed that additional private costs are (very) small compared with 
the setup cost of an incineration plant without WTE. Second, assuming electricity is appropriately priced, 
selling electricity generates resources for the incinerating company, and therefore lowers the net cost of waste 
                                                 
3 This view has not changed since (see EPA, 2002). 
4 The older incineration plants have been closed over the last decade in countries such as Belgium and France due to 
stricter environmental regulation. Newly built plants are always WTE plants, in line with the EU directive on waste 
incineration (COM(00)76): ‘Any heat generated by the incineration or the co-incineration process shall be recovered 




disposal. Third, WTE saves on electricity production and its associated externalities.  
 
Table 1. Waste incineration characteristics in some developed countries, 2001 
 
Incinerated waste 
as a % of total 
municipal waste 
Cultivated land 
as a % of total land
a 
Population density 
(people per sq. km) 
Europe  33  22  122 
  Austria  20  43  98 
  Belgium  55  45  312 
  Denmark  100  63  126 
  Finland  5  9  17 
  France  63  55  107 
  Germany  72  50  235 
  Greece  0  68  82 
  Ireland  0  64  54 
  Italy  13  53  196 
  Luxembourg  47  na  166 
  Netherlands  113  58  466 
  Portugal  0  43  109 
  Spain  9  62  79 
  Sweden  56  8  22 
  UK  5  71  246 
       
Japan  75  13  336 
       
USA  16  47  30 
a) Figures for 1994. 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, 2002; World Bank, 2002; EPA, 2002; World Resources Institute, 1998. 
 
It is widely thought that one of the major reasons for the dominance of waste incineration in general, and 
WTE in particular, is scarcity of land in some countries. Table 1, however, shows no clear correlation 
between population density or cultivated land and the percentage of domestic waste incinerated. For instance, 
the UK and Italy incinerate only small amounts of waste with relatively high population densities and levels of 
cultivated land. On the other hand, Sweden, France and Belgium incinerate a lot of domestic waste with much 
lower land scarcity indicators. Indeed, other environmental concerns, such as leakage to air, water and soil of 
particular contaminants, including hazardous waste from incineration (dioxins, ash), also influence 
preferences over waste disposal methods (Menell, 1990; Miranda and Hale, 1997). In general, incinerating 
waste is thought to provide the best solution to these problems, in particular if the energy released from the 
burning of waste is used for electricity production or heating. WTE plants are thought to be efficient energy 
plants, because they already produce heat and its use for energy production reduces climate change emissions 




It is still an open question whether modern WTE plants are the best solution or only provide a local 
optimum. That is, given a suboptimal status quo with waste incineration plants without energy recovery, WTE 
plants probably reduce the social costs of incineration. However, the overall social cost of final waste disposal 
may not be minimized if all other options for final waste disposal are considered. Whether WTE plants are a 
local or a global optimum depends on the relative performance of those plants compared with, for instance, 
landfills with energy recovery. To answer this question, it is important to incorporate all dimensions of the 
different waste disposal options systematically in a social cost–benefit analysis. As noted in the Introduction, 
joint production characteristics in terms of energy and materials recovery, as well as the environmental effects 
associated with all technologies, are important (including landfills with energy recovery).  
 
III The choice between waste disposal options 
Our goal is to evaluate existing policy preferences in a general framework that compares the social cost of 
different incineration techniques with different landfilling techniques. The best option is simply the final waste 
disposal technology that minimizes social cost at the margin. Obviously, how much waste should be 
incinerated and/or landfilled depends on the overall social cost function, viz. on the marginal cost of landfilling 
and incineration together (Brisson, 1997). If the marginal social cost of landfilling exceeds the marginal social 
cost of incineration for a given range of waste to be processed, it would be optimal for the government to 
incinerate all that waste from a social cost perspective, and vice versa. 
The social costs for final waste disposal methods include, first of all, the private and direct 
environmental costs of both disposal technologies. For a given technology, private costs split into labor and 
capital cost for operation and maintenance. Direct  environmental costs are restricted to the set of 
environmental externalities for a specific technology. Both landfills and incineration plants cause substantial 
negative environmental externalities. In general, landfills are mainly a threat to water and soil systems, whereas 
incineration contributes to air emissions and chemical waste from burned ashes. Indeed, the set of 
externalities differs widely across specific technologies. Also, the environmental and private costs are closely 
linked. For instance, with better abatement equipment (which prevents emissions to air, water and soil), 
private costs are (usually) higher and environmental costs lower.
5 
A second issue is the jointness characteristic of waste disposal methods. By choosing a specific 
technology, the government decides not only on final waste reduction and its environmental cost, but also on 
                                                 
5 Note that the comparison of the environmental costs of different options follows from their relative environmental 
performance for a given set of shadow prices. We do not impose any assumption on optimal policy – that is, on the 
government setting the optimal shadow price by weighing costs and benefits of final waste disposal methods, or 




the composition of energy production and the amount of materials recycling in the economy. Final waste 
disposal technologies differ in their jointly produced useful o utputs, and therefore also in their overall 
environmental externalities. If specific technologies allow for energy and materials recovery, however, the 
externalities cannot be attributed entirely to the waste function alone. For instance, if a specific technology 
yields a better recovery performance, this might not only save private costs in producing these outputs but 
also affect their associated environmental cost.
6 It is also important to recognize that both disposal options 
might contribute to these joint outputs. Like incineration, landfilling might go together with energy production. 
However, materials such as aluminum can be recovered from the ash after incineration, whereas it would be 
extremely costly to recover them from a landfill. Therefore, only incineration plants are able to contribute to 
additional social savings in the production of these materials.  
Thus, the government faces a wide variety of final waste disposal technologies, in particular if 
recycling characteristics (such as energy and materials recovery) are included. At one extreme, there is a 
modern, best-practice landfill site, which not only generates electricity but also runs a very small risk of 
leakage. At the other extreme, there is an old-fashioned incineration plant without electricity production and 
lacking flue gas abatement technologies to prevent air emissions (including dioxin). In our approach, both 
private and environmental costs should be considered for each available technology, including the social costs 
connected to the jointly produced outputs, energy and materials recovery.
7 
Note, once more, that our approach reflects a much wider notion of how to choose between 
landfilling and waste incineration than is usually perceived in both theory and policy. For instance, Keeler and 
Renkow’s suggestion (1994, p. 210) that waste incineration has become more favorable in recent years due to 
the growing attention given to energy recovery is not necessarily true in the more general framework we 
address. Their claim can be valid only if this option is compared with the social cost characteristics of other 
technologies, such as a modern landfill site with energy recovery.  
The view that incineration costs should be measured after subtracting the revenues from energy 
recovery earned in the electricity market (e.g. Turner, 1992; Brisson, 1997) has to be qualified. First, the 
WTE technology tends to have an upward, though admittedly small, effect on gross private incineration costs 
due to the need for some additional capital equipment. Second, and much more important, these private 
                                                 
6 If the government selects another waste technology, this indirectly affects not only its energy policy but also its 
environmental policy. Even if both energy and environmental policies in the energy sector are optimal in the status 
quo, a shift towards WTE plants would render the environmental policy towards the energy sector suboptimal 
because emissions may fall below or exceed the existing optimal emissions in this sector. 
7 In fact, for a given waste facility, we assume the very general production function denoted as f(W, E, G, X(W, E, G), 
L, K) = 0, with W, E and G representing the useful outputs waste reduction W, energy production E and materials 




revenues only reflect a net transfer between different consumers, viz. between consumers of electricity and 
final waste disposal, and this may reflect a highly distorted value (Vollebergh, 1997). Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to measure this contribution by its social value in the energy (and materials) system (including 
potential savings on both private and environmental costs). Moreover, the energy recovery potential of 
landfills should be included in the comparative analysis because energy recovery can be substantial in this case 
as well (see also the next section). 
 
IV Social cost of waste disposal options in the Netherlands 
This section presents a point estimate of the overall social cost of two ‘best-practice’ final waste disposal 
technologies for incineration and landfilling based on estimates from the Netherlands in 2000. As noted before, 
the Netherlands is densely populated, providing a prima facie reason for incineration. Indeed, Dutch final 
waste disposal policy has focused entirely on expanding incineration, in particular in WTE plants, over the last 
decade.
8 Almost 40% of the waste that could be incinerated, or 2.8 million tonnes of waste, was actually 
burned in 11 incineration plants in 1995. This percentage has increased to 70% in 2000. In addition, electricity 
and heat production from waste incineration have grown by 150% and 250% respectively between 1995 and 
2000.  
Our methodology is to put comparable  values for both direct and indirect private costs and 
externalities involved. The question of how the different technologies are priced relative to both their private 
and environmental costs is operationalized as follows. First of all, we derive private cost estimates for both 
final waste disposal options. Then, we include as much of the relevant physical environmental impacts as 
possible in order to get comparable results. Using a set of shadow prices, we turn these impacts into 
monetary values if possible. Finally, we select the relevant substitute as a reference system for each specific 
joint output. For this reference system, both private and environmental costs are estimated using cost 
estimates from other sources (see Appendix A for further details).  
Our private cost estimates for waste incineration at a state-of-the-art incineration plant are obtained 
from a study by the Ministry of Finance (2002). This study calculates the private costs for a newly built 
waste incineration plant. These numbers include (large) capital investments in both capacity expansion, with a 
normal rate of return to capital, and abatement technologies (mainly flue gas scrubbers) required by very strict 
environmental regulation (see also  Section VI). The calculations use real figures for the best-practice 
                                                                                                                                                        
and L and K as the usual labor and capital inputs. 
8 Vollebergh (1997) describes institutional details on final waste management in the Netherlands, with special 




incineration plant, accounting for cost savings that would apply if the plant were built in a market 
environment.
9 According to this study, total private costs equal Euro 103 per tonne for an incineration plant 
burning 648 ktonne per annum.
10 At this scale, the installation produces 580 kWh of electricity and 315 kWh 
of thermal heat per tonne of waste. Furthermore, 1.6 kg of aluminum and 34 kg of iron per tonne of waste is 
recovered from the ash.  
Private cost data for landfilling are much harder to obtain. No reliable figures are available for 
disposal sites in the Netherlands. Therefore we use estimates from an engineering study on the private cost of 
a landfill with best available technology (Ministry of Housing, Land Use and the Environment, 1992).
11 The 
technology considered reflects the private cost of measures against leakage required by Dutch legislation, 
which is one of the strictest in the world (see also Section VI), and includes energy recovery investments to 
generate 122 kWh of electricity per tonne of waste from landfill gas. We use the ‘worst-case’ estimate of 
Euro 36 per tonne allowing for relative price differentials across the country, such as differences in scale, 
prices for land use, etc. 
The savings on the private costs of generating electricity and materials production elsewhere in the 
economy are simply obtained from private cost estimates for gas-fired power plants in the Netherlands. 
Electricity production costs were, on average, Euro 0.036 per kWh in the Netherlands in 2000. This reduces 
the cost by Euro 21 per tonne of incinerated waste (assuming current electricity productivity of the average 
WTE plant), but only by Euro 4 per tonne of waste for the less energy-productive landfill. Finally, the private 
(opportunity) costs of materials production are obtained from world market prices for those materials having 
a positive recycling price, viz. Euro 1.23 per kg of aluminum and Euro 0.02 per kg of iron (Eurostat, 1992). 
Table 2 summarizes the gross private cost estimates for both final disposal methods and the net 
private cost including savings from the joint outputs, i.e. recovery of energy and/or materials. The result is 
straightforward: incineration is much more expensive than landfilling. Although waste incineration contributes 
to considerable private cost savings elsewhere, these savings do not by any means offset the much higher 
private cost of the incineration plant.  
                                                 
9 Dutch waste incineration plants currently compete at a national level, and in 2006 even at an international level. The 
figures have been checked in detail with regulators and plant managers in the Netherlands. 
10 The figure is based on constant total cost per tonne of waste during the operational years. Profit margins are 
allowed to increase over time when (average) capital costs decrease. We assume a net profit of 12% on invested 
capital (40% of total capital) for the owner of the plant over the entire time horizon (25 years). The scale size of 648 
ktonne is the minimum efficient scale, according to expert opinion. 
11 This somewhat older calculation still provides a reasonable approximation for overall average cost because the 
same (environmental) regulation applies in 2000 as in 1992 and inflation has been modest. Note also that the impact of 
specific price changes, such as the much higher farm land price in 2000, is still small and falls within the ‘worst case’ 





Table 2. Private cost estimates for landfilling and incineration (Euro per tonne) 
  Landfilling  Incineration 
Gross private costs  40  103 
     
Private cost savings:     
- Energy function  4  21 
- Materials function     0      3 
     
Net private costs  36  79 
 
We have also been able to include all  direct and indirect environmental costs categories using a well-
documented comparative engineering study for both waste disposal options, including their energy and 
materials productivity (CE, 1996). This study produces physical and monetary values for the environmental 
externalities. First, physical environmental impacts are available for a whole set of life-cycle emissions related 
to landfilling, incineration, energy and materials production. Second, environmental costs are calculated by 
weighting these impacts by a set of shadow prices for environmental damage.  
Given the strong regulatory constraints on both landfills and incineration in the Netherlands, these 
estimates reflect (expected) emissions of the best final waste disposal technologies currently available.
12 The 
physical environmental impacts include emissions to air for 47 different substances, such as climate change 
emissions carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4), and acid rain emissions sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen 
oxides (NOx). Furthermore, 29 water-polluting substances are included, as well as the amount of chemical 
waste (such as fly-ash) produced and land use. The estimates for incineration, materials and energy 
externalities are based on averages for existing plants (CE, 1996). For the estimation of energy externalities, 
not only is the direct generation of emissions included, but also emissions related to extraction and transport.  
The shadow prices used to calculate environmental costs reflect marginal abatement cost estimates 
by the Dutch government for physical aspiration levels for emissions to air and water, land use, waste, etc. 
(measured in emission volumes) for 2010 (relative to 1996). These cost estimates are assumed to reflect 
current minimum willingness to pay for emissions reduction in the Netherlands. Moreover, they are available 
                                                 
12 CE (1996) provides a very detailed analysis of the physical externalities associated with final waste disposal 
technologies. It still provides up-to-date material because the estimates were based on ‘state-of-the-art technology’ 




for a fairly large set of environmental impacts. The only shadow price we changed was that for land use. CE 
(1996) uses the (estimated) price of farm land in 1997 (Euro 2 per m
2), but it is hard to see why this price 
reflects any valuation of externalities related to the siting of a landfill or incineration plant. Instead, we use the 
price people are willing to pay for the most expensive opportunity forgone, which is the average price of 
housebuilding land (Euro 227 per m
2) in 2000. Finally, we use market prices for recycled materials such as 
aluminum and iron.  
 
Table 3. Environmental cost estimates for landfilling and incineration (Euro per tonne) 
  Landfilling  Incineration 
Environmental costs:     
- Emissions to air  5.85  17.26 
- Emissions to water  0.00  0.00 
- Chemical waste  2.63  28.69 
- Land use  17.88    0.00 
Gross environmental costs  26.36  45.95 
     
Environmental cost savings:     
- Energy function  4.76  22.62 
- Materials function    0.00    5.76 
     
Net environmental costs  21.60  17.57 
 
The overall environmental costs of the different functions of the waste disposal options are summarized in 
Table 3. Surprisingly, the gross environmental costs for incineration are considerably higher than those for 
landfilling per tonne of waste. Although land use causes quite high gross environmental costs for landfilling, 
the much larger emissions to air and disposal of chemical waste for incineration result in even higher 
environmental costs. In both cases, emissions to water are negligible. The best available technology for 
landfilling performs quite well, even in the Netherlands, where local conditions are not favorable to this type of 
technology.  
Including environmental cost savings from the energy and materials functions, however, changes the 
picture considerably. The low efficiency in energy recovery and the absence of materials recycling result in 




plant saves over Euro 22 per tonne in the energy production system, and nearly another Euro 6 per tonne in 
the materials production system. Therefore, the net environmental costs are indeed somewhat lower for 
incineration than for landfilling.  
Together, Tables 2 and 3 provide the overall social costs of both ‘best-practice’ technologies in the 
Netherlands. Social costs for waste incineration amount to Euro 97 per tonne of waste compared with only 
Euro 58 per tonne of landfilled waste. Even though the environmental cost of incineration is somewhat lower 
than that of landfilling, it does not outweigh the much larger private cost difference. In other words, even in a 
densely populated country such as the Netherlands, incineration seems to be a rather expensive option for 
disposing of waste. This remains true even if one allows for the joint production of energy and materials. 
Thus, our point estimate clearly rejects the hypothesis that Dutch WTE plants signal lower social cost than 
landfilling. In other words, the current policy preference for incineration is not supported by social cost data 
in a country where this support is most likely. This preference for incineration probably originates in the 
overall environmental cost savings, because incineration without recovery generates much higher 
environmental costs than the modern landfill. Net savings are far from substantial and only exist for best-
performing WTE plants that also recover materials on a considerable scale. Traditional incineration plants 
without energy and materials recovery are strongly outperformed by modern landfills.  
 
V Sensitivity analysis 
This section discusses the extent to which our conclusions depend on certain assumptions used to calculate 
our (average) social cost estimate. In other words, we test whether this cost estimate holds within a (much) 
wider confidence margin that accounts for (marginal) cost differences in either private or environmental cost, 
or both.  
First of all, our private cost estimates depend on the specific regulation required by the Dutch 
government against emissions and leakage as well as on local siting conditions. The estimates reflect land, 
labor and capital costs of a completely new landfill or WTE plant with an emission and leakage risk profile that 
complies with the very strict standards set by the Dutch authorities. Sunk costs related to existing installations 
are therefore assumed away. Obviously, actual siting costs might differ across locations due to differences in 
local circumstances (e.g. land prices are not uniform). However, we expect differences in scale effects 
between the options to be limited. Indeed, efficient operation of an incineration plant requires a minimum base 
load, which is responsible for some lumpiness in the planning of a new facility, but considerable degrees of 
freedom exist in capacity planning beyond the minimum level. Interestingly, scale effects of landfills are also 




landfill saves on siting costs caused by NIMBY problems. Therefore we expect little difference in siting costs 
between planning a landfill or an incineration plant at a specific location.
13 
Another crucial issue is the extent to which our results depend on particular (shadow) price 
assumptions. First of all, cost savings from energy recovery largely depend on the level of the energy price, in 
particular the electricity price. Higher electricity prices would render waste incineration more profitable at the 
margin (ceteris paribus) if the electricity price were 3.3 times the current price (or Eurocent 12.2 per kWh). 
However, such a price is unlikely because competition in the EU electricity market will force electricity 
producers to choose the cheapest production facilities (see Paffenbarger and Bertel, 1998, p. 7). According to 
this study, Dutch (expected) prices are also close to those in the most expensive EU country.  
Second, the environmental cost estimates are highly sensitive to the shadow prices used, although 
different prices always affect both options. A first observation is that only some emissions to air contribute 
significantly to the environmental cost in money terms. The main reason is that many emissions to air and soil 
are small and/or their shadow prices are (very) low (see Appendix A). Furthermore, different shadow prices 
for the environmental costs change our policy conclusion only if they more than compensate the much higher 
(private) cost of waste incineration. To affect the conclusion, the shadow price for the externalities needs to 
be more than 10 times higher on average. In other words, given the relatively small absolute difference in 
environmental cost between incineration and landfilling, shadow prices have to reach a very high level in order 
to compensate for the high difference in private cost. These levels are unlikely because they are beyond the 
upper bound of current, alternative estimates.  
Restricting our sensitivity analysis to the shadow prices that significantly affect the environmental 
cost estimates, we observe that our initial prices are within the margins reported in other recent studies (see 
Table 4). Individual levels of the shadow prices responsible for indifference at the margin between incineration 
and landfilling fall outside the scope of these studies. For instance, a so-called turning point (TP) could only 
be obtained with a shadow price for methane (CH4) that is 7.9 times higher than currently assumed, and the 
shadow price for NOx would have to be even 31.7 times higher than assumed currently. Note also that the 
shadow price for CO2 should be lower than currently assumed in order to produce a TP. 
Using the shadow prices of the six different studies presented in European Union (2000), we only 
find significant changes for one study. This study exploits extremely high shadow prices for all emissions, 
and, more important, a shadow price for CH4 relative to CO2 that is 6 times higher than is common in the 
                                                 
13 Assuming the (gross) local environmental cost estimates have some value in signaling potential NIMBY problems, 
siting costs for incineration and landfilling are indeed quite close. Chemical waste of incineration plants is not usually 





literature. Because higher shadow prices for CH4 are unfavorable for landfilling and higher prices for CO2 are 
unfavorable for incineration, the environmental cost difference is much smaller. A TP, however, is not even 
reached in this case either. 
 
Table 4. Shadow prices in this study compared with other studies (Euro per tonne of emissions)  
  CO2  CH4  SO2  NOx 
Our study 
- Initial  













         
Fankhauser, 1992  138  617     
CSERGE, 1993      592  456 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1995      1,191  5,162 
Externe, 1997  4–140  45–1,583    1,494–15,731 
European Union, 2000  4–42  53–2,223  2,100–12,200  4,300–18,340 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2001 
20–135       
 
Furthermore, our social cost estimate is quite insensitive to the shadow price for chemical waste and dioxins. 
Note, first of all, that a higher price for these externalities would only strengthen our conclusion that 
incineration is unattractive. The disposal of chemical waste produced by incineration plants dominates the 
environmental cost estimate of incineration. A slightly higher level of the shadow price of chemical waste 
(15% higher) renders incineration unattractive even on environmental cost alone. The external costs of dioxin 
emissions under the Dutch regulatory regime are now nearly zero. Using the highest shadow price for dioxins 
reported in European Union (2000) – Euro 713 million per TEQ – results in total environmental costs of only 
Eurocent 21 per tonne of incinerated waste. 
The shadow price for land is mainly responsible for the environmental costs of landfilling. As noted 
before, our price is based on a relatively high opportunity cost estimate in order to reflect scarcity-of-land 
considerations (Euro 227 per m
2). Less densely populated countries with more space available more likely 
face a lower shadow price for land. If this price falls below Euro 176 per m
2 or 22%, landfilling is also the 




A final issue is the calculation of the environmental cost savings of the energy function. Our 
calculation is based on a gas-using electricity plant because this type of plant delivers the marginal unit of 
electricity in the Netherlands. Other technologies would affect savings on both private and environmental 
costs. For instance, a more expensive marginal electricity plant producing fewer emissions, such as a wind 
farm or hydroelectric plant, would strengthen the case for landfilling if the additional environmental cost 
savings were smaller than the additional private cost savings. Calculations with a coal-fired electricity plant as 
the reference technology (lower private, but higher environmental, cost savings) reduce the difference in 
social cost between the options, but still leaves landfilling cheaper (Euro 54 for landfilling and Euro 81 for 
incineration). Indeed, the net environmental costs only fall to Euro 18 for landfilling, but they decline to Euro 2 
for incineration. Current climate change policy within the EU, however, weakens the case for using coal-fired 
power plants as the reference technology in the near future. 
Summarizing, our conclusion that landfilling is preferable at the margin is fairly robust. Although 
WTE plants are certainly preferable to the older incineration plants, the strong emphasis on incineration in 
Dutch waste policy is not supported by our calculations. We conclude that the social cost estimates suggest 
that the Dutch government could reduce the social cost of waste disposal at the margin by expanding landfills. 
 
VI Policy choices and consequences 
Our analysis started from the observation that waste policy within the EU is strongly founded on the 
perception that incineration is preferred to landfilling, in particular in WTE plants. The data on the Dutch case 
only provide some support for this policy preference: WTE plants perform better than modern landfills only if 
one restricts the analysis to environmental cost, but the difference is small. Private costs, however, are so 
much higher for incineration that landfilling is the social cost minimizing option at the margin. This is a 
surprising conclusion and challenges current policy preferences. This section evaluates these preferences and 
their implications in more detail. We first discuss whether our estimates for the best-practice technologies 
complying with Dutch final waste disposal standards have any wider applicability, in particular within the EU. 
Then we evaluate current policy preferences with respect to solid waste management. 
Wider applicability of our social cost estimates depends on the regulation by the government as well 
as on local siting conditions. The regulatory conditions imposed by the Netherlands have been an important 
focal point in drafting the EU directives on incineration and landfills.
14 For instance, Table 5 shows that the 
recent European standards for incineration plants are close to the Dutch ones, except for dust and acid rain 
                                                 
14 These directives are published as L 332/91 (2000) and L 182/1 (1999). Countries should have started to comply with 




emissions, in particular for NOx. As noted before, our estimates of the social cost characteristics of both 
disposal options reflect compliance with these strict rules. According to industry experts, only the stricter 
NOx limit increases private costs (by Euro 5 per tonne of incinerated waste). Without this limit, however, 
environmental costs are raised by almost Euro 3 per tonne. In other words, the difference in standards only 
slightly influences the general preference for landfilling. So we conclude that the emissions profile of the 
technologies we consider is such that they are properly called ‘best practice’, given the current EU standards, 
and might be applied everywhere in the EU. 
 
Table 5. Current environmental regulation for incineration plants in EU countries 


















Ireland  A  A  A  A  A  No 
Italy  A  A  A  A  A  No 
Sweden  A  A  A  A  A  A 
Belgium  B  A  A  A  A  na 
Denmark  B  A  A  A  A  No 
Spain  B  A  A  A  B  B – 120 
UK  B + 0.9  B + 15  B  B  A  B – 50 
Austria  B  B + 5  B  B  B  B – 100 
Germany  B  B  B  B  B  B 
France  B  B – 5  B  B  B – 10  B – 130 
Netherlands  B  B – 5  B  B  B – 10  B – 130 
             
A = EU (1989)  No limit  30  100  50  300  No limit 
B = EU (2000)  0.1  10  50  10  50  200 
Note: A and B refer to the EU (1989) and EU (2000) Directives respectively. 
Source: Ministerie van Financien, 2002. 
 
The other issue is whether the difference in social costs would be affected by differences in siting 
conditions between countries (assuming similar standards). This is certainly the case, as local ecological 
conditions as well as local prices differ, and we only have a point estimate based on average cost. First of all, 
note again that local circumstances are particularly unfavorable to landfills in the Netherlands. Indeed, the 




treating leachate and monitoring groundwater) raise the private costs of landfills considerably. Other siting 
locations with a much lower risk of leaking (e.g. on hard rock) could be exploited at much lower social cost 
per tonne of landfilled waste, which would further strengthen the case for landfilling. Private cost differences 
for incineration with similar standards are much less likely to be affected by local ecological circumstances, 
and amount to differences in wages and user cost of capital across countries.
15 Note, furthermore, that our 
environmental cost estimate for landfills is likely to be high judged by European standards. The estimate is 
dominated by the shadow price for land use (68% of the gross cost), and this price would be (much) lower in 
less populated areas in Europe. As noted in the previous section, a 22% lower shadow price for land would 
render landfilling cost-efficient from the environmental perspective alone!  
Applying our results to final waste disposal policies, we find strong support for both recent EU and 
US policy to focus on energy recovery in improving the environmental performance of final waste disposal. 
This policy should certainly also include landfills. In most countries, energy production from landfill gas is not 
yet common. It has been estimated that the proportion of waste in sites with gas control ranges from as little 
as 10% in Greece to 90% in the UK and Germany (see Smith et al., 2001, p. 98). Also, in the USA, only 10% 
of landfill sites produced electricity in 1997 (EPA, 1999). Methane recovery from a landfill is likely to save on 
overall private cost and certain to save on environmental costs. Without gas recovery and flaring, the net 
environmental costs of a landfill nearly double, to Euro 43 per tonne.
16 Although energy recovery from 
landfills does not reduce gross environmental costs, it is certainly important in reducing net environmental 
cost at a relatively small investment.  
A related issue is the prevalence of the typical disposal technologies assumed, and whether they are 
cost-efficient from the social cost perspective. For instance, further improvements in the energy efficiency of 
waste incineration would be possible using a larger boiler with higher steam pressure and machinery for 
reheating the steam. Such a so-called high-efficiency incineration plant would improve energy efficiency from 
the conventional 20% to 30%. The additional capital cost (including the lower availability of the plant due to 
more maintenance), however, would increase net private cost by Euro 15 per tonne of waste in the 
Netherlands.
17 According to our calculations, environmental cost would only be reduced by Euro 11 per tonne 
of waste, which does not compensate for the rise in private cost at the margin. Including energy recovery in 
                                                 
15 Comparing private cost differences between landfilling (based on observed prices including tax) and incineration 
(based on assumed differences in (average) wages and the corporate income tax) across the EU reveals that all EU 
countries except Austria face a larger wedge than the Netherlands (see Ministry of Finance, 2002). 
16 Note that we exclude externalities such as stench. Interestingly, stench associated with landfills is correlated to 
methane emissions, and therefore its nuisance is also strongly reduced by energy recovery on landfills. 
17 Not surprisingly, the Dutch Waste Processing Association (VVAV) prefers an energy efficiency of 20% for new 




landfills also finds strong support from the empirical evidence, even from a private cost perspective alone. 
According to Miranda and Hale (1999), the private costs of introducing gas recovery at a landfill are less than 
Euro 3 per tonne of waste, while the private cost savings are equal to Euro 4 per tonne (see Table 2). In fact, 
the rents are much higher from the social cost perspective because the gross environmental costs without 
energy recovery would be much higher (see earlier). 
Finally, current Dutch and EU policy on final waste disposal, in contrast to the US policy, reflects a 
hierarchical preference with respect to incineration over landfilling. According to our social cost evaluation, 
this hierarchical approach would only be justified if the marginal social cost of incineration were smaller than 
that of landfilling across the whole range of disposable (and flammable) waste.
18 Our results do not provide 
any evidence for this preference; rather, the opposite is true, i.e. landfilling should be the preferred option. 
However, a point estimate is not entirely suited to being applied across the whole range of disposable waste, 
although our sensitivity analysis supports wider applicability. The suboptimality of the hierarchy at the margin 
is based on the assumptions that both existing and new facilities comply with the strong EU regulation, and 
that shadow prices remain constant over the entire waste disposal stream. This is a useful starting point for 
the Netherlands today, but Table 5 also shows that many countries within the EU apply laxer standards. 
Moreover, even for the Netherlands, it would be rather naive to expect that shadow prices would remain 
constant if all waste were landfilled in the future. 
Indeed, current standards differ considerably across EU Member States, and this also affects both 
private and environmental costs of existing facilities. For instance, in 1999, all 72 French incinerators for 
which data were available produced more dioxins per tonne of waste than our Dutch plant, while 26 even 
produced 10 times as much. One expects not only lower private costs, but also much higher environmental 
costs, for these plants. Assuming private costs are lower for these French incineration plants than for the best 
available incineration technology, one also expects waste migration towards this less costly alternative. 
Differences in regulation may have major impacts on the overall private cost of specific technologies, and 
therefore also drive potential waste races to the bottom.  
Evaluating optimal standard setting within the EU is beyond the scope of our paper,
19 but this example 
clearly illustrates that our general findings only hold for best available technologies complying with a particular 
                                                 
18 This implies a corner solution in a model where the social cost minimizing agent optimizes final waste disposal 
subject to several constraints describing the jointness characteristics of the waste disposal production process. 
Interior solutions, i.e. solutions that allow for both incineration and landfilling to be optimal, are possible only if the 
marginal costs of both options vary enough over certain ranges of waste to be disposed. 
19 Note that we do not have to assume optimal standard setting. Such standards imply that the higher private cost of 
abatement equipment is outweighed by the savings on additional environmental costs. Our social cost analysis, 




set of standards. Indeed, a large number of French incinerators will be closed, given the newly established 
legislation in France, which is similar to Dutch standards (see Table 5). However, several countries across 
Europe only comply with the 1989 directive, and still have to adapt to the latest directive. Similar observations 
hold for landfills. Indeed, the current EU efforts to harmonize emission standards for both incineration plants 
and landfills may be considered essential in creating a fair level playing field.
20 
It is essential to separate carefully issues of (optimal) standard setting from the (optimal) final waste 
disposal strategy, even though these issues are closely connected. Our findings are valid for the strong Dutch 
incineration and landfill standards. Compliance with these standards might impose high costs on non-
complying countries. These costs are considerable if the focus is on expanding incineration based on these 
new standards, while a modern landfill is a serious, much cheaper alternative. To use the French example 
again, with a shadow price for dioxins of Euro 713 million per TEQ, 20 incineration plants produce even 
higher environmental costs than our landfill. Apparently, waste incineration plants without dioxin abatement 
equipment are outperformed by our modern landfill from an environmental cost perspective alone. The choice 
of the French government to invest in incineration conforming to EU policy instead of investing in modern 
landfills imposes a huge burden on French society. 
The (implicit) assumption of constant marginal cost behind our point estimate is rather strong, and 
implies that landfilling is the preferred solution for all disposable waste now and in the future. However, it is 
unlikely that consuming more land for the purpose of landfills would not change shadow prices (but note that 
a continuing stream of the much more polluting chemical waste from incineration is not likely to keep shadow 
prices constant either). Nevertheless, we think that a less rigid approach, such as that in the USA, also seems 
optimal for the EU. Many useful spots for landfills are still available, while standards are already set and only 
require appropriate monitoring. A common waste market without further restrictions is likely to generate a 
more efficient solution for waste disposal. 
 
VII Conclusions 
From a social cost minimizing perspective, we find little support for a hierarchical approach towards final 
waste disposal methods. WTE plants are only a local minimum if waste incineration is expanded anyway. 
Because energy recovery is a joint product obtainable with small additional investments in technology, not only 
will the net private cost be lower but also the environmental cost of the energy system. However, this strategy 
does not attain a global optimum, given a rather strict set of standards applying to landfills and incineration 
                                                 
20 Note that a set of minimum standards would be equally justifiable. Accordingly, Member States might impose 





Our average cost estimate of the two best available options in the Netherlands indicates much higher 
gross environmental cost for a WTE plant than for a modern landfill. Only if the current energy system is 
rather polluting are WTE plants attractive relative to landfills from an environmental cost perspective alone. 
Certainly, in countries such as France and Belgium, with their much lower climate change emissions from the 
electricity sector, WTE plants may be a very expensive climate change abatement option. The net private cost 
is so much higher than that for landfilling that it is hard to understand the rationale behind the current 
hierarchical approach towards final waste disposal methods in the EU. Landfilling with energy recovery is 
much cheaper, even though its energy efficiency is considerably lower than that of a WTE plant. 
To illustrate, according to our calculations, switching from a modern landfill to a WTE plant as 
required by the hierarchical approach would save 508 kg of CO2-equivalent, or Euro 17 per tonne of waste, 
while the social cost difference between incineration and landfilling is Euro 39. This is equal to an abatement 
cost of Euro 77 per tonne of CO2-equivalent, which is over 3 times higher than other options available (see 
Hendriks et al., 2001). Even slightly higher savings can be reached by switching from a landfill without flaring 
or energy recovery to the best available landfill technique including energy production. This saves almost 40 
kg of CH4 or 585 kg of CO2-equivalent or Euro 20 per tonne of waste, at a modest additional private cost. 
One important caveat remains. Further empirical research is necessary to compare our calculations 
for the Dutch case with other techniques employed in practice at other locations. Moreover, most landfills do 
not recover energy, and leaking is often a serious problem, especially for older landfill sites. These types of 
landfills are even less costly to exploit than our modern site, but their environmental costs can be prohibitive. 
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